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In the second case, 51 the court denied a motion to dismiss a
complaint for failure to join a foreign sovereign who was immune
from suit in this jurisdiction. The court decided that the nonjoinder of the party could be excused in the interests of justice
under section 1001. The court indicated that the possibility that
the State of Basellande might have a direct cause of action against
defendant for breach of warranty with respect to material supplied
to plaintiff for installation in a hospital in Switzerland pursuant
to a contract between plaintiff and Basellande was too remote to
make it a necessary. party to the action.
Thus, although precedent will still be influential in the area,
section 1001 appears to afford greater discretion in permitting an
action to continue despite the fact that a "necessary" party has
not been joined.
Section 1003 -

Nonjoinder and Misjoinder of Parties

Section 1003 of the CPLR provides that where there has
been a nonjoinder or misjoinder of proper parties, the court, either
on its own initiative or on the motion of -any party, may add or52
drop a party "upon such terms as are just." In a recent case
the defendant, an insurance company, issued a fire policy payable
to the "Estate of Frank Pallante."
The insured property was
destroyed, and plaintiff, as devisee of the property under the
unprobated will of Frank Pallante, sought a declaratory judgment
determining the policy's coverage. Plaintiff joined as defendants
her brother, the. executor of the unprobated will, and her sister,
who had filed obiections to the will. Defendant insurance company moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff lacked capacity to sue. The court indicated that even though
plaintiff might lack the capacity to maintain the action, it would
not presently dismiss the complaint. A dismissal would apparently
have barred any remedy because the one year limitation in the
policy had already run.
The court, under the authority of section 1003, made the
executor, who had been named a narty defendant, a party plaintiff,
with leave to serve a supplemental complaint.5 3 While under Section 192 of the CPA it had been held that an action would not
be dismissed merely because one of the plaintiffs was not entitled
to the relief sought,54 there was little precedent as to whether
51 Johns-Manville Int'l Corp. v. Insul-Fil Co., 41 Misc. 2d 233, 245
N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
52Cariello v. Northern Ins. Co., 41 Misc. 2d 456, 244 N.Y.S.2d 713

(Sup.
53 Ct 1963).
54 1d. at 461-62, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
Majestic Loose Leaf, Inc. v. Cannizzaro, 10 Misc. 2d 1040, 169 N.Y.S.
2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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the former -provision5 5 authorized the court to substitute a new
party plaintiff, if the original plaintiff was not entitled to maintain
the action.
This same question has created marked disagreement in the
federal courts under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It has been held that rule 21 does not admit of substitution and therefore a sole party plaintiff or defendant could not be
dropped and another added.56 On the other hand, in conformity
with a more liberal approach, substitution has been permitted in
cases where the same person would be a party both before and
after substitution, 57 or where there was a mistake as to the person
entitled to bring suit.6s
The court in the present case, by permitting the executor to
become a party plaintiff, seems to indicate that under section 1003
the more liberal view of permitting substitution will be followed.
Here the executor made no formal motion to be made a party
plaintiff, but requested this relief in his affidavit submitted in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss. Certainly the result
is sanctioned by the broad discretion afforded the court under
section 1003 and the precedents under the CPA, indicating that
the section should be liberally construed.5 9 Allowing substitution
will prevent the abatement of an action where the statute of limitations has run, and will expedite trials by avoiding the unnecessary
delay involved in requiring an action to be commenced anew on an
identical subject matter.
Section 1007 and Ride 1010-

Third-Party Practice

Section 1007 of the CPLR authorizes impleader where a third
person may be liable over to the defendant "for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant," the same criterion used for
third-party practice by the CPA. The purposes of this section are
to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to determine initial and ultimate
liability in one action.60 The CPLR section governing the avail55 CPA §§ 192-93.
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Gruman v. Sturgeon Bay Winter Sports Club, 304

F.2d 93

(7th Cir.

1962); Matsuoka v. United States, 28 F.R.D. 350 (D.C. Hawaii 1961);
United States v. Swink, 41 F. Supp. 98 (E.D. Va. 1941). For a criticism
of this
view, see 3 Mooas, FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 2907 (2d ed. 1943).
57
Owen v. Paramount Productions, 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
58

Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

313 U.S. 559 (1941); In re Raabe Glissman & Co., 71 F. Supp. 678
(S.D.N.Y. 1947); Keystone Tel. Co. v. United States, 49 F. Supp. 503
(E.D.N.Y. 1943).

59Albano v. Michaelson, 14 Misc. 2d 76, 175 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct
1958); Mapley v. Board of Educ., 13 Misc. 2d 88, 175 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup.
Ct. 1958).
60 See 2 WEINSTEIN, KoRxu & MIuE, Nzv YoRE CivIL PRAcncE i"
1007.01 (1964).

